Aleksandra Matykiewicz and Dorota Gierszewski (Ed.)

German and Polish Perspectives on Migration, Refugee and Border Policy in Europe

Sonder-
druck
2025

Berliner
Wissenschafts-Verlag

Table of contents

ALEKSANDRA MATYKIEWICZ & DOROTA GIERSZEWSKI
Introduction 7

1. Migration Policy as a Challenge for the European Union

JANUSZ JÓZEF WĘC
Legal, Institutional, and Aid Instruments of the European Union in Addressing the Refugee and Humanitarian Crisis in Ukraine (2022–2024)
A Case Study of the Desecuritisation of the Migration Crisis 11

ADAM KIRPSZA
I say 'No'!
Understanding Member States' Contestation of European Union Migration and Asylum Legislation in the Council of the EU 39

2. Migration Policy of Poland and Germany

ALEKSANDRA MATYKIEWICZ
Poland's Migration Policy 65

ALEKSANDRA TRZCIELIŃSKA-POLUS
Migration Processes as a Relevant Determinant of German-Polish Political Relations 79

EWA KAMARAD
Family Reunification in Migration Law of Germany and Poland
Selected Issues 91

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules
https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

3. Migration Policy in Political Rivalries

RAFAŁ RIEDEL / ALEXANDER RADUNZ
Migration, European Integration, and Cultural Hesitation
The German and Polish Electorates in Comparison 107

JAN SCHALLER
Emigration, Alienation, Protest
On the Complexity of Political Radicalization in East Germany 123

4. Integration of Immigrants in Germany and Poland

NORA RATZMANN / DENIS ZEKOVIĆ
Navigating Challenges of Integrating Newcomers in Germany
Local Resilience through Collaborative Governance? 139

JAN BRZOZOWSKI
Syrians in Germany and Ukrainians in Poland
An Assessment of Assisted Integration and Laissez Faire Policy Models 151

DOROTA GIERSZEWSKI
Citizenship Education as an Antidote to Nativism
Promoting Social Cohesion in a Migrant Society 169

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules
https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

Legal, Institutional, and Aid Instruments of the European Union in Addressing the Refugee and Humanitarian Crisis in Ukraine (2022–2024)

A Case Study of the Desecuritisation of the Migration Crisis

JANUSZ JÓZEF WĘC

Abstract: This chapter analyses the European Union's response to the 2022–2024 refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. The author first presents the legal, institutional and aid instruments implemented by the EU to address the crisis, and then compares the Ukraine crisis with the EU's migration crisis of 2015–2016. Finally, he assesses both crises from a theoretical perspective. The author concludes that the EU securitised the 2015–2016 migration crisis and desecuritised the 2022–2024 Ukrainian crisis.

Keywords: Temporary Protection Mechanism, European Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Desecuritisation of the Migration Crisis

Introduction

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has triggered one of the largest refugee crises worldwide since the Second World War. According to UNHCR data, between 24.02.2022 and 31.12.2024 (UNHCR, 2024b, 10)[1], a total of 43,883,730 displaced persons crossed Ukraine's borders into Poland, Slovakia, Moldova, Romania, and Hungary. Of these, 40,352,655 subsequently returned to Ukraine. The majority of refugees crossed into Poland (27,473,825), followed by Hungary (6,311,965), Romania (5,852,255), Slovakia (3,001,235), and Moldova (1,244,455) during the specified period. The corresponding numbers of returnees to Ukraine from these countries were as follows: 25,481,455 from Poland; 5,780,315 from Hungary; 5,061,990 from Romania; 2,965,775 from Slovakia, and 1,063,125 from Moldova. Furthermore, during the same period, some refugees fled to Russia and Belarus during the same period, with 2,852,395 individuals crossing into Russia and 15,890 into Belarus[2]. However, data from Russian and Belarusian sourc-

1 The reference date of 31.12.2024 is conventional, as data were collected on different dates: Poland (14.01.2025), Slovakia and Hungary (9.02.2025), Moldova (31.01.2025), and Romania (1.12.2024).
2 Data for Russia were recorded as of 30.06.2024, while data for Belarus were collected as of 31.12.2024.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

es regarding their potential return to Ukraine are unavailable. This means that, in total, 46,752,015 displaced persons crossed Ukraine's borders into neighbouring states during the period under analysis, while at least 40,352,655 returned (UNHCR, 2024b, 1–2).

This chapter presents legal, institutional, and aid instruments implemented by the European Union in response to the refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine between 2022 and 2024. In response to the mass influx of war refugees caused by Russia's aggression against Ukraine, EU institutions chose to implement pre-existing legal and institutional mechanisms that had been previously underutilised or never activated. These include the Temporary Protection Mechanism for war refugees, the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) mechanism, and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). The economic and macro-financial assistance mechanisms for Ukraine discussed in this chapter – specifically activated by the EU for this purpose – include two instruments, namely the Instrument for Macro-Financial Assistance + (MFA+) and the Ukraine Facility. With regard to EU humanitarian aid mechanisms, this analysis will cover the REACT-EU and UCPM instruments, along with the EU's Strategic Reserve, which was reactivated in response to the refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. Additionally, the study will examine emergency humanitarian assistance directed towards war refugees and civilians in Ukraine, funded through reallocations from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF), and the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD). Finally, economic, macro-financial, and humanitarian support instruments provided by EU Member States, as well as by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), will also be presented. The analysis is essentially limited to the legal framework as of 31.12.2024.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

This study is guided by three research objectives: one primary objective and two specific objectives. The primary objective is to examine the effectiveness of the European Union's response to the refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, which was triggered by Russia's aggression between 2022 and 2024 (O1). The specific objectives include evaluating the significance of the legal and institutional instruments used by the EU in addressing this crisis (O2), as well as identifying and exploring the scope and impact of the EU's economic, macro-financial, and humanitarian aid instruments, along with those provided by its Member States, for Ukraine, its war refugees, and its civilian population (O3). This chapter also formulates two research hypotheses. The first hypothesis posits that the European Union and its Member States handled the refugee and humanitarian crisis caused by Russian aggression in Ukraine far more effectively than the migration crisis of 2015–2016 (H1). The second hypothesis suggests that

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

the European Union and its Member States actively engaged in the desecuritisation of the Ukrainian crisis (H2). In this context, the study seeks to answer the following three research questions: (Q1) What legal, institutional, and aid instruments did the EU employ to address the refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, and how effective were they?; (Q2) How was the crisis perceived within the European Union and its Member States?; (Q3) How was the desecuritisation of the Ukrainian crisis carried out?

This chapter primarily employs two qualitative research methods: the institutional-legal method and the comparative method. The first is used to analyse EU legal acts in detail. The latter is used to enable, even in a summarised form, a comparison between the migration crisis of 2015–2016 and the 2022–2024 refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. In addition, this method facilitates the identification of six key differentiating factors between these crises.

Furthermore, this paper refers to two theoretical frameworks: securitisation theory and desecuritisation theory. Securitisation theory, developed in the 1990 s by scholars of the Copenhagen School of security studies (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde), explores how threats of critical significance to state and societal security are defined, typically by political elites and the media. According to this perspective, such threats are often presented as existential in nature, necessitating the mobilisation of extraordinary security measures for their neutralisation. The Copenhagen School views securitisation as a negative phenomenon – an extreme form of politicisation in which even imagined threats to state and societal security are constructed, resulting in the implementation of emergency measures. Another scholar and critic of the Copenhagen School, Ali Diskaya, argues that the core premise of securitisation theory is that "in international relations an issue becomes a security issue not because something constitutes an objective threat to the state (or another referent object), but rather because an actor has defined something as existential threat to some object's survival" (Diskaya, 2013, 2). At the same time, some proponents of the theory consider desecuritisation as a positive phenomenon, offering alternative solutions to threats and challenges that emerge in crisis situations, including migration crises (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998, 23–24). According to Ole Wæver, the détente policy of the 1970 s serves as a key example of the negotiated desecuritisation between East and West. He argues that this policy contributed "to the modifications of the Eastern societies and systems that eventually made possible, via sudden desecuritisation, the radical changes of 1989" (Wæver, 1998, 10). Thus, if securitisation employs extraordinary measures to eliminate actual or perceived existential threats, then desecuritisation addresses security concerns through conventional political measures.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

The European Union in Search of an Adequate Response to Migration Crises

One of the European Union's responses to the 2015–2016 migration crisis was an attempt to reform its immigration policy, external border controls, and asylum policy (Węc, 2017, 14–24, 35–38). However, an analysis of legislative statistics indicates that the legislative packages proposed by the European Commission between 2015 and 2018 largely failed (Węc, 2023a, 25–44). Of the 14 legislative proposals submitted by the Commission, only three were adopted in 2015–2016. These included two Council Decisions from 14 and 22.09.2015, which established provisional migrant relocation schemes, as well as the European Commission Recommendation from 8.06.2015 on a European resettlement scheme (Procedure, 2015a, 1; 2015c, 1; 2015e, 1–2; European Commission, 2015, 32–37). Three further drafts were withdrawn by the Commission itself between 2019 and 2021 (Procedure, 2015b, 1–2; 2015d, 1–2; 2016c, 1–2), while legislative work on seven drafts prolonged and was not concluded by 2020.

As a result, the EU failed to establish effective permanent legal and institutional frameworks capable of effectively addressing the 2015–2016 migration crisis and future migration challenges. A key reason for this failure was that most of the Commission's drafts faced serious objections and controversies among Member States. The most significant one – the establishment of a permanent relocation mechanism – was blocked by Member States, leading the Commission to withdraw the draft in 2019 after four years of unsuccessful negotiations. Meanwhile, the provisional relocation mechanisms established by the Council Decisions of 14 and 22.09.2015 yielded only partial success. The first decision, based on a voluntary agreement among Member State governments in a resolution of 20.06.2015, was in force from 16.09.2015 to 17.09.2017. The second decision, which imposed a legal obligation on Member States to carry out relocations, was in force from 25.09.2015 to 26.09.2017. Both mechanisms aimed to relocate 160,000 migrants from Italy and Greece to other EU Member States but achieved only moderate results. Additionally, both decisions temporarily suspended certain provisions of the Dublin III Regulation, particularly Article 13(1), which assigned responsibility for processing asylum applications to border states such as Italy and Greece rather than the countries to which migrants were relocated. A turning point in managing the 2015–2016 migration crisis came with the EU-Turkey agreement of 18.03.2016 on cooperation in combating the migration crisis, which introduced the EU-Turkey 1:1 scheme. The implementation of this agreement was highly effective, significantly reducing migration along the Eastern Mediterranean route, including the influx of war refugees from Syria (Węc, 2023, 25–44).

Despite the failure of the 2015–2018 legislative initiatives, the European Commission remained committed to addressing migration challenges. On 23.9.2020, it announced the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which aimed to comprehensively reform the EU's immigration policy, external border control, and asylum system. Contrary to the

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

official title given by the Commission, however, this was not an entirely new legislative package. The New Pact included ten legislative proposals, but only three were entirely new. The remaining proposals had already been under negotiation between 2016 and 2018. For five of them, political compromises had already been reached at the level of the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, while the remaining two were modified by the Commission itself. The core element of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum was the draft regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on migration and asylum management (European Commission, 2020, 3–4). The draft proposed the establishment of a new permanent solidarity mechanism among Member States in asylum policy, the clarification of migrant registration procedures, and the introduction of migrant relocation and return sponsorship procedures. The proposal aimed to repeal and replace the Dublin III Regulation and continue the reform of the Common European Asylum System, initiated in 2016. In many respects, this draft mirrored the 2019 Commission proposal for a permanent relocation mechanism, which had been withdrawn. The newly proposed permanent solidarity mechanism – intended to replace the permanent relocation mechanism – once again sparked significant political controversy (European Commission, 2020, 45–50). On 18.12.2020, the governments of six EU Member States – Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, and Slovenia – issued a joint non-paper, submitting it to the outgoing German Presidency and the incoming Portuguese Presidency. The document strongly criticised the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, particularly the proposed permanent solidarity mechanism. These states deemed the proposed distribution key for asylum seekers within the EU "unacceptable", as it was based on an algorithm incorporating population size and GDP of each country (Non-paper, 2020, 2).

For a long time, legislative efforts concerning the Regulation on Migration and Asylum Management, as well as the remaining nine legislative proposals, failed to yield any breakthroughs. The only exception was the Regulation adopted on 15.12.2021, which transformed the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) into the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) (Procedure 2016a, 1). The EUAA became operational on 19.01.2022. A political compromise on the remaining nine legislative drafts was finally reached at the turn of 2023 and 2024. These new legal acts – comprising seven regulations and two directives – were adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on 10.04 and 14.05.2024, respectively (Procedure 2020c, 1–2; 2016b, 1–2; 2016d, 1–2; 2016e, 1–2; 2016f, 1–2; 2016 g, 1–2; 2018, 1–2; 2020b, 1; 2020a, 1–2).

The prolonged legislative process concerning the Pact on Migration and Asylum, coupled with the possibility of applying extraordinary legal measures for war refugees in the Ukrainian crisis, led the European Union to implement the three aforementioned legal and institutional instruments: the Temporary Protection Mechanism for war refugees, the Integrated Political Crisis Response Mechanism, and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

Legal and Institutional Instruments of the European Union and EU Member States in Addressing the Crisis

Temporary Protection Mechanism for War Refugees

The first legal instrument was Council Decision 2022/382, adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 4.03.2022, which determined the existence of a mass influx of war refugees from Ukraine into the European Union (Council, 2022c, 1–6). This decision served as an implementing act for Council Directive 2001/55/EC on temporary international protection, which had been adopted earlier on 20.07.2001 in response to the mass influx of displaced persons into the EU, particularly from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, due to the Balkan conflicts at the time. The implementing decision entered into force on the day of its adoption. Initially, it was valid for one year, but the Justice and Home Affairs Council extended its validity three times: first until 4.03.2024, then until 4.03.2025, and most recently until 4.03.2026 (Council, 2024, 1–2). The decision covered Ukrainian nationals residing in Ukraine before 24.02.2022, along with stateless persons and third-country nationals (other than Ukrainians) who had been granted international protection or equivalent national protection in Ukraine before this date. It also extended to family members of the aforementioned individuals (Article 2(1) of the Decision). The European Commission was responsible for coordinating cooperation and information exchange among Member States, particularly in monitoring reception capacities and identifying the needs of displaced persons. In this regard, the Commission collaborated with EU Member States, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), and Europol. All three agencies were also mandated to provide operational support to any EU Member State that requested assistance in handling the influx of refugees and implementing the decision (Article 3(2) of the Decision) (Council, 2024, 5–6).

The Council Implementing Decision, in accordance with the provisions of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20.07.2001, enabled the establishment of a temporary protection mechanism for war refugees from Ukraine across the entire territory of the European Union (Directive 2001, 163). Denmark, which – pursuant to Protocol No. 22 annexed to the TEU and the TFEU – was not bound by the directive (Protocol, 2012, 299–300), provided temporary protection to Ukrainian refugees under its own national programme. Meanwhile, Ireland, which – under Protocol 21 annexed to the TEU and the TFEU – has the flexibility to opt in or out of cooperation within the area of freedom, security, and justice, chose to participate in the adoption and implementation of the directive in this instance (Protocol, 2012, 295–296).

As mentioned earlier, the temporary protection mechanism for war refugees from Ukraine guaranteed them immediate and collective protection. This meant that host countries were not required to assess asylum applications individually. However, tem-

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

porary protection did not prejudge the recognition of refugee status under the Geneva Convention of 28.07.1951, supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31.01.1967 (Art. 3(1) of the Directive). On the contrary, beneficiaries of the temporary protection within the EU had the right to apply for asylum at any time. If an asylum application was not processed before the expiry of the temporary protection period, the procedure could continue beyond that period (Art. 17(1)–(2) of the Directive). Registration under the temporary protection mechanism granted individuals a status equivalent to that of a displaced person. Temporary protection ensured respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the principle of non-refoulement (Article 3(2) of the Directive). Furthermore, the establishment, implementation, and suspension of the temporary protection mechanism were to be regularly consulted with UNHCR and other relevant international organisations (Art. 3(3) of the Directive). All measures outlined in the directive under consideration were to be financed through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (Art. 24 of the Directive). To address the specific needs of Member States (including those concerning persons with disabilities), emergency mechanisms and flexibility instruments under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 were also activated. Applications for temporary protection for war refugees could also be submitted in Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland, as these countries are part of the Schengen area under separate international agreements with the EU.

Under Articles 12, 13(1)–(4) and 14(1)–(2) of Council Directive 2001/55/EC, refugees were granted: the right to reside in the host country; access to accommodation; social assistance; access to the labour market (depending on the labour policies of EU Member States); medical assistance, including psychological care and support for children; the right to education and vocational training for minors; legal assistance and safe accommodation for unaccompanied minors; access to banking services (e. g. the right to open a basic bank account); the right to visa-free movement within the EU (outside the country of residence in the EU) for up to 90 days within a 180-day period after a residence permit in the host EU country is issued; and the right to relocate to another EU country, either before or after a residence permit is issued. A person registered under temporary protection could move to another EU Member State, or to Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, or Switzerland, as the rights conferred by temporary protection were equivalent across all these countries. If a registered individual chose to relocate, they were only required to inform the authorities of the Member State where they were initially registered. Upon relocation, the individual would lose their residence permit from the initial Member State, and the destination country would then register them, grant them temporary protection status, and issue a new residence permit (Directive, 2001, 166).

The effectiveness of the European Union's response to temporary protection beneficiaries was particularly evident in three key areas: the number of refugees registered; guaranteed access to refugee rights under Council Directive 2001/55/EC; and the rel-

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

atively short waiting time for registration of displaced persons. According to Eurostat data, between 24.02.2022 and 31.12.2024, a total of 4,260,000 refugees from Ukraine were registered under the EU's temporary protection mechanism, including in Denmark and Ireland, while 151,526 individuals registered in EFTA states. In total, EU and EFTA countries granted temporary protection to 4,411,526 refugees.[3] Among EU Member States, the highest numbers of displaced persons were registered in Germany (1,161,450), Poland (991,630), and Czechia (388,625), followed by Spain (226,615), Romania (179,715), Italy (163,100), Slovakia (131,525), the Netherlands (121,300), Ireland (109,990), and Belgium (87,240) (cf. Table 1) (Eurostat, 2024e, 1–3; 2024a, 1–3; 2024f, 1–3). As of the end of December 2024, the percentage shares of the three countries that admitted the largest number of beneficiaries in the entire EU were as follows: Germany – 27.3 % of the EU total, Poland – 23.3 %, and Czechia – 9.1 % (Eurostat, 2024e, 1–3). It is important to note that Ukrainian refugees frequently exercised their right to relocate between EU Member States, leading to significant fluctuations in refugee numbers across different countries from 2022 to 2024. For instance, the peak number of registered refugees in Germany occurred on 31.12.2023, reaching 1,251,245 persons. In Poland, the highest point was recorded much earlier, on 30.09.2022, when Eurostat statistics showed 1,370,625 beneficiaries. In Czechia, the peak was reached on 28.02.2023, with 447,830 refugees registered. In the following months, the number of registered refugees declined in Poland and Czechia, whereas in Germany, it continued to rise.

As of 31.12.2023, the lowest recorded number of beneficiaries was observed in Poland and Czechia (954,795 and 373,035 persons, respectively), while Germany recorded the highest number (1,251,245 persons) (Eurostat, 2024c, 1–2). Naturally, refugees relocating from Poland and Czechia did not register exclusively in Germany but also in other countries, with the most frequent destinations being Austria, the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, and Norway (Eurostat, 2024b, 1–2). Compared to the end of November 2024, the number of individuals under temporary protection increased by 25,590 across the EU by the end of December 2024 (+0.6 %). The largest absolute increases were recorded in Germany (+8,830; +0.8 %), Poland (+3,705; +0.4 %), and Czechia (+3,435; +0.9 %). Conversely, only three EU countries experienced a decrease in the number of beneficiaries of temporary protection: Denmark (- 1,995; - 5.1 %), Italy (- 1,310; - 0.8 %), and France (- 595; - 1.0 %) Eurostat (2024e, 1–2).

---

3 According to UNHCR data, as of 16.11.2025, the total number of registered Ukrainian war refugees worldwide was 6,863,400. Of these 6,303,200 were in Europe and 560,200 were in non-European countries, including approximately 400,000 in Canada and the USA. Additionally, around 3.6 million Ukrainians remain internally displaced (IDPs) within their own country, although millions of IDPs have already returned home (UNHCR, 2024a, 1–2; 2024c, 1–2). Furthermore, between 24.02.2022 and 31.08.2024, a total of 11,743 civilians were killed in Ukraine, while 24,614 were injured (U. S. Committee, 2024, 1–3).

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

Table 1 Beneficiaries of temporary protection in EU countries and EFTA countries at the end of December 2024

State/Date	31 December 2024
European Union (27)	**4,260,000**
Austria	85,555
Belgium	87,240
Bulgaria	68,935
Croatia	25,950
Cyprus	22,160
Czechia	388,625
Denmark	36,920
Estonia	35,435
Finland	69,385
France	59,125
Germany	1,161,450
Greece	32,570
Hungary	39,165
Ireland	109,990
Italy	163,100
Latvia	48,090
Lithuania	48,250
Luxembourg	3,870
Malta	2,220
Netherlands	121,300
Poland	991,630
Portugal	65,290
Romania	179,715
Slovakia	131,525
Slovenia	10,150
Spain	226,615
Sweden	46,410
EFTA	**151,526**
Iceland	4,020
Liechtenstein	700
Norway	78,765
Switzerland	68,050
Total EU and EFTA	**4,411,526**

Source: prepared by the author based on Eurostat, 2024b, 1–2.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

In relative terms, as of 31.12.2024, the number of temporary protection beneficiaries per 1,000 inhabitants in the EU population (449,206,579 residents) stood at 9.50. The following countries exceeded the EU average: Czechia (34.80), Poland (26.90), Estonia (25.30), Latvia (25.30), Slovakia (23.70), Cyprus (23.50), Ireland (20.30), Liechtenstein (16.70), Lithuania (16.50), Norway (13.90), Germany (13.70), Finland (12.10), and Iceland (10.00). The lowest rate per capita was recorded in France (0.90), although its official statistics generally do not include minors (cf. Table 2) (Eurostat 2024c, 1–2; 2024f, 1–5)[4].

According to Eurostat data as of 31.12.2026, the demographic structure of Ukrainian beneficiaries under EU temporary protection, categorised by gender and age, was as follows: 60.2 % of all beneficiaries were women, while 39.8 % were men. Among women, 40.6 % were in the 18–64 age group, whereas among men, only 21.3 % fell into the same category. Women aged 65 and older accounted for 4.4 % of beneficiaries, while men aged 65+ represented 1.7 %. Children (both boys and girls) aged 0–17 constituted 22 % of all beneficiaries. This meant that the largest group among the registered beneficiaries – a total of 82.2 % – consisted of Ukrainian women and children (cf. Figure 1).




Fig. 1 Structure of EU temporary protection beneficiaries by age and sex as of 31 December 2024 (%)*

*Data include EU Member States, except for Hungary, which did not provide information on age group distribution, and France, which generally does not report data on minors.

Source: Eurostat, 2024d, 1–2.

4 For further details on the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive, cf.: Commission, 2023, 1–27.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

Table 2 Number of beneficiaries of temporary protection in EU and EFTA countries per 1000 population as of 31 December 2024

State/ Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries registered under the temporary protection mechanism or similar national programs as of 31.12.2024	EU population as of 1.01.2024	Number of beneficiaries / 1000 population
UE	**4,260,000**	**449,206,579**	**9.48**
Austria	85,555	9,158750	9.34
Belgium	87,240	11,832,049	7.37
Bulgaria	68,935	6,445,481	10.69
Croatia	25,950	3,861,967	6.72
Cyprus**	22,160	933,505	23.74
Czechia	388,625	10,900,555	35.65
Denmark	36,920	5,961,249	6.19
Estonia	35,435	1,374,687	25.78
Finland	69,385	5,603,851	12.38
France*	59,125	68,401,997	0.86
Germany	1,161,450	83,445,000	13.91
Greece**	32,570	10,397,193	3.13
Hungary	39,165	9,584,627	4.08
Spain**	226,615	48,610,458	4.66
Ireland	109,990	5,343,805	20.06
Italy	163,100	58,989,749	2.76
Lithuania	48,250	2,885,891	16.72
Latvia	48,090	1,871,882	25.69
Luxembourg	3,870	672,050	5.76
Malta	2,220	563,443	3.94
Netherlands	121,300	17,942,942	6.76
Poland	991,630	36,620,970	27.08
Portugal	65,290	10,639,726	6.14
Romania	179,715	19,064,409	9.43
Slovakia	131,525	5,424687	24.25
Slovenia	10,150	2,123,949	4.79
Sweden	46,410	10,551,707	4.40
EFTA	**151,526**	**14,949,966**	**10.14**
Iceland	4,020	398,940	10.08
Liechtenstein	700	40,023	17.49
Norway	78,765	5,550,203	14.19
Switzerland	68,050	8,960,800	7.59
Total EU and EFTA	**4,411,526**	**464,156,545**	**9.50**

* French data generally does not include minors.
** The number of persons under temporary protection at the end of the month in Spain, Greece and Cyprus includes some persons whose temporary protection status was no longer valid.
Source: prepared by the author based on Eurostat, 2024c, 1–2.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

A UNHCR report from October 2023 on the implementation of Council Directive 2001/55/EC on temporary international protection in EU Member States, based on survey research, indicated that at the beginning of the crisis, refugees in several countries reported long queues and waiting times associated with registration in the temporary protection scheme. This was partly due to the large number of applicants and the uneven distribution of displaced persons across EU Member States. Significant improvement was observed only after the digitalisation of the refugee registration process. As a result, from August 2022, in most EU Member States, the registration process was significantly shortened, with waiting times reduced to between 30 minutes and a few days. Furthermore, 78 % of refugees surveyed reported issues arising from family separation after leaving Ukraine. Additionally, 24 % of respondents stated that persons with special needs, including people with disabilities, encountered barriers preventing them from fully exercising their rights, accessing services, or even obtaining information about available services (including healthcare) and employment opportunities. In several countries, the identification and registration of unaccompanied minors by host country authorities remained a challenge, limiting their access to healthcare and other essential services (UNHCR, 2023, 10–11)[5].

However, analyses conducted by the European Migration Network (EMN) – an EU Commission agency monitoring the implementation of Council Directive 2001/55/EC in EU Member States[6] – led to the following conclusions: Primarily, all Member States provided access to the rights guaranteed under the directive, including housing, employment, healthcare, and education. However, housing shortages, particularly in large cities, remained a significant issue. Next, due to prolonged procedures for the recognition of professional qualifications and language barriers, integration into the labour market in host countries posed a major challenge for beneficiaries. Further, while Member States guaranteed access to healthcare, this was significantly hindered by language barriers. Moreover, initially, all countries faced logistical obstacles in access to education due to disparities in language proficiency and, in some cases, limited school capacity in certain regions. These issues were partially mitigated through language courses, supplementary programmes, and school infrastructure expansion. In addition, mechanisms for the identification and support of unaccompanied minors and separated children faced logistical challenges. Also, in all EMN Member States, beneficiaries of temporary protection could also apply for asylum, regardless of whether they were already registered or covered by temporary protection. Finally, in most countries, beneficiaries of temporary protection were allowed free movement within the European Union for up to 90 days within a 180-day period without losing their

5 The authors of the report did not specify in which EU Member States these barriers were encountered.
6 With the exception of Denmark, which is not an EMN member.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

status or benefits. However, violations of these rules could lead to suspension or loss of benefits, depending on the duration of absence from the host country (EMN, 2024, 18–37).

Recent scientific studies, although limited to Visegrad Group countries, confirmed some of the EMN findings. At the same time, the authors also assessed the responses of national governments, local authorities, NGOs, the media, and civil society to the Ukrainian crisis (Humanitarian, 2024, 30–204). They concluded that one of the most significant challenges in addressing the refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine was the delayed response of the governments of the Member States analysed. In general, local and regional authorities played a far more active role in supporting refugees than central governments. Meanwhile, NGOs, volunteers, and civil society provided highly active and mostly spontaneous assistance. These informal "support networks and volunteers were organised through social media" (Humanitarian, 2024, 200). Since the vast majority of refugees arrived in EU Member States with minors, the "effective organisation of care and education systems" was seen as "a prerequisite for labour market integration." As the crisis continued, the "effectiveness of refugee integration into the labour market became increasingly dependent on the willingness of market entities, national or international production and service companies to support employment activation" (Humanitarian, 2024, 201–202). Over time, as the crisis persisted, the engagement of informal support networks weakened, while public opposition to accepting refugees grew. This, in turn, increased the influence of "nationalist and extremist groups" in EU Member States (Humanitarian, 2024, 203). Additionally, there were at least two major barriers preventing Ukrainians from securing qualified employment: recognition of Ukrainian diplomas and other professional qualification documents in host countries, and limited proficiency in the language of the host country (Humanitarian, 2024, 202).

Integrated Political Crisis Response

The second legal instrument in addressing the refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine was the Justice and Home Affairs Council Decision of 27.12.2022, which led to the activation of the Integrated Political Crisis Response (ICPR) mechanism (Council, 2022b, 1–3). IPCR, as an institutional crisis response instrument, was established by the Council of the European Union on 25.06.2013. This mechanism can be activated either by the Presidency or by any EU Member State, invoking Article 222 TFEU (the solidarity clause). Its purpose is to develop coordinated crisis response agreements and facilitate joint decision-making by the EU in cases of major and complex crises, including terrorist acts. In previous years, the IPCR was activated several times in ad hoc mode.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

However, in response to the Ukrainian refugee and humanitarian crisis, the first IPCR roundtable (Council, 2022b, 1–3)[7] was convened as early as 28.02.2022. Subsequent roundtables addressed issues such as humanitarian aid (mainly healthcare, medical supplies, and accommodation equipment), EU support for the reception of displaced persons, and external border management assistance (including security checks and border registration). These roundtables were chaired by the EU Presidency and involved representatives from the European Commission, the European External Action Service, EU agencies, the Government of Ukraine, the Cabinet of the President of the European Council, and subject-matter experts (Council, 2022b, 1–3).

On 28.03.2022, the European Commission announced a 10-Point Plan for stronger European coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war from Ukraine. The plan included the following support instruments: (1) launching an EU platform for registration, known as the Solidarity Platform, to coordinate all crisis response efforts, including cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities and other stakeholders from Ukraine; (2) establishing an EU-level coordinated approach in relation to the transport and information hubs at key points along the displacement route (border crossings, bus and train stations, large transit accommodation centres, etc.); (3) enhancing reception systems and ensuring continuity of care and suitable accommodation for refugees (e. g. the "Safe Homes" initiative to leverage private housing as part of the response); (4) developing a common European contingency and response plan to coordinate medium- and long-term refugee needs, as foreseen in national contingency plans; (5) introducing standard operating procedures and uniform guidance for the reception and support of children, paying particular attention to the needs of children with disabilities, unaccompanied minors and separated children, including swift identification and registration, accommodation, and prevention of trafficking; (6) developing a shared anti-trafficking plan to address the risks of trafficking and support potential victims; (7) ensuring the provision of adequate resources and funding to finance the above-mentioned actions (The 10-Point Plan, 2022, 1–3).

The Solidarity Platform enabled Member States to exchange information on individuals registered under the temporary protection or other forms of protection under national law. As part of its role in coordinating cooperation with national transport and information hubs, the EUAA, in close collaboration with relevant on-site organisations, was responsible for providing information on reception centres and unaccompanied minors. The European Commission was responsible for coordinating ongoing refugee support, working alongside Member States and UNHCR to ensure consistent

7 In Oct. 2015, the Luxembourg Presidency decided to activate the IPCR in information-sharing mode to monitor migration flows, support decision-making, and improve the implementation of agreed measures. The following month, the Presidency launched IPCR in full mode, enabling the EU to regularly hold roundtables with stakeholders to coordinate its response to various migration-related issues. Through this mechanism, the EU monitored crises, such as the 2021–2022 migration crisis on the Poland-Belarus border.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

care. It was also tasked with developing an EU Common Index, to which Member States, EU agencies, and international organisations were expected to contribute. This index was designed to track migration trends, assess pressures on reception systems, and enable swift responses at both national and EU levels. Under the leadership of the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, the Solidarity Platform worked closely with Member States and EU agencies, including the European Labour Authority and Europol, to develop a coordinated strategy to combat human trafficking and provide support for potential victims (The 10-Point Plan, 2022, 1–3).

On 8.06.2022, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted political conclusions on children's rights, highlighting the need to safeguard children's rights during crises and emergencies. It emphasised the importance of protecting children affected by armed conflicts and their consequences by referencing the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. These measures focused particularly on preventing child conscription, human trafficking, illegal adoption, sexual exploitation, and family separation (Council, 2022a, 1–11). On 24.06.2022, the EC urged Member States to provide displaced Ukrainian children with free legal assistance and access to healthcare, ensure that unaccompanied and separated children arriving from Ukraine are aware of their rights and are integrated into national child protection systems, and maintain high reception standards for children (European Council, 2022, 1–3).

European Union Civil Protection Mechanism

The third legal and institutional instrument in addressing the refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine was the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). It was established by Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom of 23 October 2001 to strengthen cooperation between EU Member States in civil protection interventions (Council, 2001, 7–11). This decision has been amended multiple times, most recently by Regulation (EU) 2021/836 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20.05.2021 (Regulation, 2021, 1–22). The mechanism is responsible for coordinating EU-level responses to natural disasters and humanitarian crises caused by human actions. It covers both preventive measures (to mitigate the effects of future emergencies and disasters) and immediate aid for populations affected by crises. This aid includes search and rescue operations, deployment of medical personnel and equipment, provision of medicines, temporary shelter, and safe repatriation of EU citizens.

The UCPM comprises all EU Member States, as well as the United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. The mechanism operates through the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), established on 25.06.2013, which monitors global events 24/7 and coordinates the EU's response. Any country worldwide, along with the United Nations and other international organisations, can request ERCC assistance when a

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

natural disaster or humanitarian crisis exceeds their capacity to respond. Upon receiving a request, the ERCC mobilises and coordinates aid provided by Member States[8].

When Ukraine submitted a request for inclusion in the civil protection programme on 24.02.2022, the day of Russia's aggression, the European Union – at the request of Slovakia – immediately activated the UCPM. From that point on, the EU began coordinating its largest-ever civil protection operation in the history of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. All EU Member States, as well as Iceland, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, and Turkey, took part in the response. The material assistance provided encompassed a wide range of supplies – from medical equipment and shelter provisions to vehicles and energy infrastructure equipment. To improve the efficiency of aid distribution to Ukraine, logistics hubs were set up in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. On 13.03.2022, the EU launched the evacuation of individuals from Ukrainian territory who required medical intervention. Nine days later, on 22.03.2022, the EU Humanitarian Office was opened in Lviv. On 19.04.2022, the EU allocated € 45 million in humanitarian aid to people directly affected by Russia's invasion. Through the UCPM, EU Member States were able to request essential supplies to meet the needs of displaced persons from Ukraine residing in their territory, while also benefiting from EU co-financing for such assistance (European Council, 2024a, 1–4). The total value of in-kind assistance and emergency operations coordinated by the EU between 2022 and 2024 amounted to € € 970 million, and included the evacuation of over 3,900 patients from Ukraine to hospitals across the EU, the delivery of more than 153,000 tonnes of material aid to Ukraine, and the provision of over 8,800 power generators and more than 3,400 specialised transformers (European Council, 2024c, 3–4).

The legal and institutional instruments applied by the European Union and its Member States to address the refugee and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine have proven to be highly effective. They enabled war refugees to register almost immediately under temporary protection, ensuring rights and benefits comparable to those granted to asylum seekers. Additionally, substantial humanitarian aid was provided through the IPCR and UCPM, benefiting not only refugees and civilians in Ukraine but also Ukrainian authorities.

---

8 Since 2001, the UCPM has been activated over 600 times, both within and outside the EU, in response to crises such as the repatriation of civilians from Afghanistan (2021), the pandemic crisis (2020–2022), forest fires across Europe (2021–2022), and most recently Russia's war against Ukraine (2022–2024), and the earthquake in Turkey and Syria (2023) (European Council, 2024a, 1–4).

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

Economic, Macro-Financial, and Humanitarian Aid from the EU and its Member States to Ukraine

Beyond the legal and institutional measures, the European Union and its Member States have provided significant economic, macro-financial, and humanitarian support to Ukraine in response to the crisis. This assistance can be divided into the following two categories: economic and macro-financial aid from the EU, individual Member States, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), aimed at supporting Ukraine's economy, managing emergencies, and rapid reconstruction; and humanitarian aid from the EU and its Member States, directed at Ukrainian refugees residing in EU countries and civilians in Ukraine[9].

Economic and Macro-Financial Assistance

Economic and macro-financial assistance began reaching Ukraine almost immediately after Russia's invasion. In the first seven months of the war, the EU, its Member States, the EIB, and the EBRD provided a total of € 19.73 billion in highly preferential loans to support Ukraine's macroeconomic stability, economic, social and financial resilience, and ability to manage its recovery and public debt servicing. The EU's loans – totalling € 10.2 billion – were classified as emergency macro-financial assistance and were granted under three decisions of the European Parliament and the Council on 24.02, 12.07, and 20.09.2022 (Decision, 2022a, 4–11; 2022b, 1–7; 2022c, 1–13). However, a major turning point in economic and macro-financial aid came with the adoption of the Macro-Financial Assistance+ (MFA+) instrument by the European Parliament and the Council on 14.12.2022. This regulation established a structured, long-term framework for economic and macro-financial aid, providing an additional € 18 billion in preferential loans and targeted grants, funded either from the EU budget or Member States' budgets. The funding also covered interest payments, urgent economic needs, the reconstruction of critical infrastructure, and the initial post-war rebuilding of the country (Regulation, 2022, 1–14).

Equally important was the creation of the Ukraine Facility, established through a regulation adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 29.02.2024. This mechanism aims to provide long-term financial assistance in the form of grants and loans, with a total value of up to € 50 billion between 2024 and 2027. These funds are intended for rebuilding, reconstructing, and modernising Ukraine's economy, main-

9 It is important to note that since 2014, the European Union has allocated funds from the EU general budget to support economic reforms and investments in Ukraine.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

taining macroeconomic stability, financing new investments, and supporting reforms related to Ukraine's accession to the EU. A total of € 32 billion has been allocated specifically for these EU accession-related reforms, as outlined in Ukraine's Recovery Plan, which was presented by the Ukrainian government on 20.05.2024 and subsequently approved by the Council of the EU on 14.05.2024 (Regulation, 2024, 1–47).

Between 2022 and 2024, the total economic and macro-financial assistance provided by the EU, Member States, the EIB, and the EBRD to support Ukraine's economy, emergency management, and initial reconstruction amounted to € 64.3 billion. Of this amount, € 49.3 billion was allocated from the MFA+, the Ukraine Facility, and other EU sources. Additionally, the EU guaranteed € 2.8 billion in EIB and EBRD loans for the Ukrainian government and companies providing essential services. Meanwhile, grants from EU Member States, along with guarantees for loans from the EIB and EBRD, amounted to € 12.2 billion between 2022 and 2024 (cf. Table 3).

Table 3 Economic and macro-financial assistance from the EU, Member States, and financial institutions 2022–2024

Entity	Objective	Amount (in billion EUR)
EU Member States	Grants and loan guarantees (including from EIB and EBRD)	12.20
European Union	Economic and macro-financial assistance effectively provided between 2022 and 2023	25.20
	Ukraine Facility (payments and commitments in 2024)	19.60
	Other forms of support	4.50
	Loan guarantees (including from EIB and EBRD) from 2022 to 2023	2.80
Total		**64.30**

Source: prepared by the author based on European Council, 2024d, 3–4.

Humanitarian Aid

Between 2022 and 2023, the European Union provided € 17 billion to Member States hosting Ukrainian refugees. Of this, € 7 billion came from unused regional policy funds from the EU's multiannual budget for 2014–2020, while € 10 billion was allocated through REACT-EU. These funds were used primarily to support accommodation, education, and healthcare for displaced persons (Regulation, 2024, 7–8)[10]. Beyond

10 REACT-EU is an EU financial programme with a budget of € 47.5 billion, designed to mitigate the social and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and to support the transition towards green and digital

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

this, between 2022 and 2024, the EU and Member States provided humanitarian aid to both civilians in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees in Europe. While EU humanitarian aid totalled € 1 billion, the humanitarian assistance provided by Member States during this period amounted to € 2.6 billion.

These funds were allocated to cover the basic needs of Ukrainian civilians and refugees, such as food and water, basic household appliances, healthcare and psycho-social support; temporary shelter (including winter accommodation), protection, particularly emergency education, and financial aid to cover essential daily expenses. Additionally, as noted earlier, under the UCPM, the EU provided Ukraine with € 970 million in financial aid between 2022 and 2024. This funding was used for accommodation, medical supplies, power generators, vehicles, and specialised equipment to address public health risks (including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards). Furthermore, in response to Ukraine's increasing need for medical supplies, the EU strategic reserve, originally established in 2019, was reactivated. This reserve includes: a fleet of firefighting aircraft and helicopters; medical evacuation aircraft; medical response teams and field hospitals; a stockpile of medical supplies and mobile laboratories; temporary housing units; and transport and logistics support (cf. Table 4) (European Council, 2024c, 3–4).

Table 4 Humanitarian assistance from the EU and member states for Ukrainian civilians and Refugees (2022–2024)

Type of humanitarian assistance	Amount (in billion EUR)
ERDF, ESF, AMIF and FEAD: unused allocations from 2014–2020	7.00
REACT-EU instrument	10.00
EU humanitarian aid under UCPM	0.97
EU humanitarian aid for civilians and refugees	1.00
Humanitarian aid of EU Member States	2.60
Total	**21.570**

Source: prepared by the author based on European Council, 2024c, 3–4, 7–8.

Between 24.02.2022 and 31.12.2024, the total economic, macro-financial, and humanitarian aid provided by the European Union, its Member States, the EIB, and the EBRD reached a staggering € 85.87 billion. As outlined earlier, this amount was distributed as follows: € 64.3 billion to support Ukraine's economy, emergency response, and initial reconstruction; € 17 billion allocated to EU Member States to assist refugees; € 4.57 billion in humanitarian aid for Ukrainian civilians and displaced persons. Addition-

economies in Member States. The legal basis for the programme is the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of 23 December 2020 (Regulation, 2020, 30–42).

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

ally, € 47.3 billion has been earmarked to strengthen Ukraine's armed forces and train Ukrainian soldiers under the EUMAM Petersberg Task[11]. An additional € 35 billion is planned to be spent in the next few years as part of exceptional macro-financial assistance and a mechanism using the proceeds of immobilised Russian assets to repay Ukrainian loans[12]. As a result, the total implemented or guaranteed economic, macro-financial, humanitarian, and military assistance provided by the EU, its Member States, the EIB, and the EBRD to Ukraine between 2022 and 2024 has reached an unprecedented € 133.17 billion, excluding additional funds planned for the coming years (cf. Figure 2). The effectiveness of economic, macro-financial, and humanitarian aid is evident in the EU's ability to respond rapidly to the Ukrainian crisis. Nowhere else in the world have the EU and its Member States shown such unwavering commitment and efficiency in delivering aid as they have in Ukraine.




Fig. 2 Economic, macro-financial, humanitarian and military assistance of the European Union, EU Member States, and financial institutions to Ukraine in 2022–2024

Source: prepared by the author based on European Council, 2024e, 1–8.

11 Military support included funds earmarked by individual EU Member States (€ 41.2 billion), Norway (€ 36 million), the European Peace Facility (€ 6.1 billion) for Ukraine's urgent military and defence needs, including € 2,5 billion to reimburse EU Member States for weapons and ammunition supplies to Ukraine and to increase production capacity for artillery shells and surface-to-surface missiles (European Council, 2024f, 1–2). For further details on the European Peace Facility, which was established in 2021, cf. J. J. Węc (2023b, 135–137).

12 On 21.05.2024, the EU Council passed regulations approving the use, from mid-2025, of revenues stemming from immobilised Russian assets to support Ukraine's self-defence and reconstruction. 95 % of the proceeds from Russia's immobilised state assets will be incorporated into the EU's general budget and used for the Ukraine loan cooperation mechanism. The remaining 5 % will be allocated to the European Peace Facility. Additionally, on 24.10.2024, the EU Council approved a financial aid package for Ukraine, fulfilling commitments made by the G7. This package includes a loan of up to € 35 billion under the extraordinary macro-financial assistance programme and a mechanism redirecting the proceeds from immobilised Russian assets to assist Ukraine in repaying its loans (European Council 2024f, 2–3).

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

Desecuritisation of the Ukrainian Refugee and Humanitarian Crisis by the European Union and Member States

The 2015–2016 migration crisis in the EU serves as a benchmark for evaluating the EU and Member States' response to the Ukrainian crisis. Given the EU's past struggles in coordinating its response to the mass influx of migrants, many anticipated that the Union would face even greater difficulties managing the *exodus* of Ukrainian war refugees. However, the outcome was different: The European Union handled this new challenge much more effectively than in 2015–2016. To understand why this was the case, it is first necessary to identify the key differences between the two migration crises. At least six factors can be distinguished. The first difference lay in the causes of both crises. The 2015–2016 migration crisis was triggered by the aftermath of the Arab Spring (2010–2013), the rise of the so-called Islamic State in 2014, and political and economic instability in dysfunctional African states. The Ukrainian refugee and humanitarian crisis, however, was the direct result of Russia's brutal military aggression against Ukraine in 2022 and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, which unfolded right on the EU's doorstep. The second differentiating factor was the status of the displaced persons. In 2015–2016, asylum applications in the EU were submitted by both war refugees from Syria and Iraq and economic migrants from other Asian and African countries.[13] In 2022–2024, only war refugees applied for temporary international protection in EU countries under Council Directive 2001/55/EC. The third difference was the scale of displacement. In 2015–2016, the total number of asylum applications reached 2,582,780. By October 2024, the number of registered Ukrainian war refugees who had received international protection stood at 4,198,490. In 2022 alone, 41,196,770 Ukrainians crossed the borders of neighbouring EU countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania) (UNHCR, 2024b, 1–2; UNHCR, 2017a, 1–9; UNHCR, 2017b, 1; Eurostat, 2024f, 1–2; Eurostat, 2024a, 1–2). The fourth distinguishing factor was the gender and age composition of migrants. In 2015–2016, approximately 80 % of migrants were young men from the Middle East and Africa. In 2022–2024, 82.2 % of refugees were Ukrainian women aged 18–65, and children under 17. Additionally, the majority of Ukrainian refugees either declared their intention to return or planned to do so after the war, with some even returning earlier. The fifth difference was the EU's approach to managing both crises. In response to the 2015–2016 migration crisis, the EU launched a comprehensive reform of immigration, asylum policy, and external border control, which ultimately failed. Furthermore, the EU introduced new humanitarian and financial instruments as well as aid programmes, including search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean, humanitarian and development assistance, a crackdown on human

13 By comparison, in 2015 alone–the first year of the previous crisis–Frontex recorded 1,822,337 attempted illegal border crossings into the EU. According to European Commission data, nearly 90 % of these migrants paid organised criminal groups and smugglers to facilitate their journey to Europe (Węc, 2017, 8).

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

smuggling networks, programmes to curb uncontrolled migration, voluntary resettlement programmes, and return programmes. In contrast, during the 2022–2024 Ukrainian refugee and humanitarian crisis, the EU did not push for new legislative solutions. Instead, it activated existing legal and institutional instruments, particularly the Temporary Protection Mechanism for war refugees. The sixth distinguishing factor was the perception of both crises by governments, local authorities, the media, and NGOs in EU Member States. Unlike in 2015–2016, EU governments reacted to the Ukrainian refugee and humanitarian crisis with deep solidarity for the Ukrainian population affected by Russia's violent invasion. The geographical proximity of the conflict – right on the EU's doorstep – also played a significant part (European Council, 2024b, 5). The diplomatic engagement of some EU governments, including Poland, was crucial in convincing other countries to provide assistance. Moreover, civil societies in several EU Member States, volunteers, national and local NGOs, and civil society actors in host countries played a massive role in supporting displaced persons. The reaction of EU Member States media was also markedly different from that in 2015–2016. For example, Polish media – particularly social media platforms – were often active initiators of aid efforts for refugees. Similarly, Ukrainian diaspora communities and the refugees themselves mobilised to provide assistance and protection to those fleeing the war. When considering societal engagement, scale of aid, and moral support, Poland – especially its civil society – stood out as one of the most active EU Member States. On a massive scale, Polish citizens sheltered Ukrainian war refugees in their own homes, an act of generosity that earned international admiration from both foreign governments and public opinion worldwide.

The differences in the perception of these two migration crises, as indicated above, can be effectively explained through the theories of securitisation and desecuritisation. In the context of migration, Jef Huysmans argues that "the securitization of migration in the EU and its Member States has developed on the basis of three relating themes: internal security, cultural security and the crisis of the welfare state" (Huysmans, 2000, 758). According to Huysmans, since the 1980 s, immigration has been viewed as a destabilising factor in the EU's economic integration process, primarily due to the slow pace of migrant integration in host societies. "Migration increasingly was a subject of policy debates about the protection of public order and the preservation of domestic stability", which "represented migration as a challenge to the welfare state and to the cultural composition of the nation." (Huysmans, 2000, 756). As a result, "immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees" were "framed as a security problem which is different from an approach by means of a policy which emphasizes that asylum is a human rights question and/or which proposes human rights instruments to deal with the issue" (Huysmans, 2000, 757).

Applying the assumptions of these two theories to the issue of the mass influx of migrants to the EU in 2015–2016 and then in 2022–2024, as analysed in this paper, it must be stated that the sources of the two distinct approaches to migrants during

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

these two periods primarily lie in how migrants were perceived in terms of nationality, ethnicity, and culture. In 2015–2016, most EU governments, as well as the media and societies, largely viewed migrants from the Middle East and North Africa negatively, while in 2022–2024, broad solidarity was extended to Ukrainian war refugees. During the 2015–2016 crisis, the image of migrants was shaped by ethnicity, culture, and gender. By contrast, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian refugees were viewed not only as war refugees but as culturally and religiously similar to other Europeans[14]. While the influx of migrants from Asia and Africa was seen as a threat to security and national identity, these concerns did not apply to either Ukrainian labour migrants who arrived before the war or war refugees from 2022–2024.

If the 2015–2016 migration crisis was viewed by EU institutions, Member State governments, and the media primarily as a threat to the EU's internal security, then the 2022–2024 Ukrainian refugee and humanitarian crisis was largely framed as a humanitarian challenge requiring solidarity with the Ukrainian people in the face of Russia's invasion and the ongoing war, which also carried potential long-term consequences for the EU. Consequently, while the 2015–2016 crisis saw EU institutions and Member States securitise migration, the 2022–2024 response was characterised by desecuritisation measures. The securitisation measures adopted by EU institutions during the 2015–2016 migration crisis aimed to limit the mass influx of displaced persons into the European Union through a series of coordinated actions, including the introduction of temporary relocation schemes between 2015 and 2017, the signing of the 1:1 deal with Turkey, and the establishment of new agencies or the strengthening of existing institutions responsible for securing the EU's external borders. At the same time, securitisation policies pursued by EU Member States involved tightening border security and constructing physical barriers along external borders (e. g., Hungary), introducing temporary internal border controls within the EU (e. g., Austria, Germany), and depicting the mass arrival of migrants in negative terms, a stance widely adopted by segments of the political elite and the media. In contrast, the EU and its Member States adopted a desecuritisation approach to the Ukrainian refugee and humanitarian crisis, which focused on establishing legal and institutional conditions that facilitated the swift and almost automatic registration of war refugees under the temporary protection mechanism, delivering substantial economic, macro-financial, and humanitarian aid to war refugees, civilians, and the Ukrainian government, and framing the crisis in a way that promoted humanitarian and solidarity-based responses.

---

14 Language and cultural proximity were crucial factors in accelerating the integration of Ukrainian refugees into certain EU Member States. For instance, in Poland, where the languages and cultures of both nations were closely related, "support and integration into local society were faster and more effective". By contrast, in Hungary, where "language barriers were more pronounced", the integration process proved significantly more difficult (Humanitarian, 2024, 201).

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

Conclusions

This analysis leads to two primary conclusions. First, the European Union's response to the Ukrainian refugee and humanitarian crisis (2022–2024) was highly effective, significantly more so than its handling of the 2015–2016 migration crisis. Second, the EU and its Member States adopted a desecuritisation approach to the Ukrainian crisis. Both research hypotheses H1 and H2, formulated in this chapter, have thus been confirmed by the available source material.

In answering the first research question (Q1), the effectiveness of the EU's legal, institutional, and aid measures can be demonstrated in two key ways. First, the European Union successfully accommodated the largest number of war refugees in its history, granting them nearly all the privileges typically afforded to asylum seekers in record time. Between 24.02.2022 and 31.10.2024, 4,198,490 Ukrainian refugees registered under the EU's Temporary Protection Mechanism, including in Denmark and Ireland. Second, the total economic, macro-financial, humanitarian, and military assistance implemented or guaranteed by the EU, its Member States, and financial institutions between 2022 and 2024 reached an unprecedented € 133.17 billion, excluding additional funds planned for the coming years. The effectiveness of the temporary protection mechanism for war refugees lay in its ability to offer immediate and collective protection to those fleeing war. This meant that while host countries were not required to assess individual asylum applications, refugees were still granted residency rights in their host country, access to employment and housing, medical care, and the right to education for their children. Moreover, the mechanism allowed refugees to apply for asylum at any time, with procedures continuing even after the temporary protection period had expired. The economic, macro-financial, and humanitarian aid provided by the EU, its Member States, the EIB, and the EBRD played a crucial role in strengthening Ukraine's economy, funding urgent economic needs, rebuilding critical infrastructure, covering interest payments on outstanding loans, and initial post-war reconstruction efforts. Meanwhile, humanitarian aid for refugees in the EU and civilians in Ukraine not only symbolised solidarity with the Ukrainian people but also proved to be a crucial tool for delivering highly effective emergency assistance. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that the EU's success in managing the mass influx of Ukrainian refugees would not have been possible without the involvement of civil society, volunteers, local NGOs, and other civil society actors, particularly in certain Member States. In this regard, Polish society played a key role, providing shelter to Ukrainian refugees on an unprecedented scale, often within private homes.

In answering the second research question (Q2), the author identified six fundamental differences between the 2015–2016 migration crisis and the Ukrainian refugee and humanitarian crisis, namely: the root causes of each crisis, the legal status of displaced persons, the scale of displacement, the demographic profile of migrants, the perception of each crisis by EU governments, media, and societies, and the different

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

response strategies employed by the EU and its Member States. In answering the third research question (Q3), it was concluded that the EU's desecuritisation approach primarily involved three types of actions: (1) activating existing but rarely used legal and institutional instruments, particularly the temporary protection mechanism; (2) providing extensive financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, war refugees, and civilians; and (3) framing the crisis as a humanitarian emergency, fostering both humanitarian action and solidarity, motivating EU Member States, EU institutions, and societies to respond collectively in the face of Russia's aggression and the war taking place right on the EU's doorstep.

References

Sources

European Union (2001). Council Decision of 23.10.2001 establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions, (2001/792/EC, Euratom). OJ L, No. 297.

Council of the European Union (2022a). Conclusions on the EU Strategy on the rights of the child, 10024/22, Brussels.

Council of the European Union (2022b). Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council, Main results, Brussels, (27.12.2022). https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2022/02/27/; access date 15.12.2024

Council of the European Union (2022c). Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4.03.2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection, OJ L, 2022, No. 71.

Council of the European Union (2024). Ukrainian refugees: Council extends temporary protection until March 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/25/ukrainian-refugees-council-extends-temporary-protection-until-march-2026/; access date 15.12.2024

Decision (2022a) (EU) 2022/313 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24.02.2022 providing macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, OJ L, 2022, No. 55.

Decision (2022b) EU 2022/1201 (2022a) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12.06.2022 providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, OJ L, 2022, No. 186.

Decision (2022c) (EU) 2022/1628 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20.09.2022 providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, reinforcing the common provisioning fund by guarantees by Member States and by specific provisioning for some financial liabilities related to Ukraine guaranteed under Decision No 466/2014/EU, and amending Decision (EU) 2022/1201, OJ L, 2022, No. 245.

Directive 2001/55/EC (2001) on the rules for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and measures promoting a balance of efforts between EU Member States, OJ L, 2001, No. 212.

European Commission (2015). Recommendation (EU) 2015/914 of 8.06.2015 on a European resettlement scheme, OJ L, 2015, No. 148.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

European Commission (2020). Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund], 2003/109/WE, (COM(2020) 610 final). Brussels.

European Commission (2023). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Temporary protection for those fleeing Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: one year on, (COM(2023) 140 final). Brussels

European Council meeting (2022) – Conclusions, Brussels, 24.06.2022, EUCO 24/22.

European Council (2024a). EU civil protection, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/civil-protection/; access date 15.12.2024

European Council (2024b). EU response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine (EU, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/; access date 30.12.2024

European Council (2024c). EU solidarity with Ukraine. Humanitarian assistance of the European Union, EU Member States, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-solidarity-ukraine/

European Council (2024d). EU solidarity with Ukraine (2024d). Financial assistance of the European Union, EU Member States and financial institutions, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-solidarity-ukraine/; access date 30.12.2024

European Council (2024e). EU solidarity with Ukraine. Financial, humanitarian and military assistance of the European Union, EU Member States and financial institutions, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-solidarity-ukraine/; access date 30.12.2024

European Council (2024f). EU solidarity with Ukraine. Military support, https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine_en; access date 30.12.2024

Eurostat (2024a). Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. Annual aggregated data (rounded). Fi st Time Applicant, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asyappctza/default/table; access date 13.12.2024

Eurostat (2024b). Beneficiaries of temporary protection at the end of the month by citizenship, age and sex – monthly data, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asytpsm/default/table?lang=en ; access date 13.12.2024

Eurostat (2024c). Non-EU Citizens who fled Ukraine and were benefitting from temporary protection at the end of March 2022 and December 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Temporary _protection_ ; access date 13.12.2024

Eurostat (2024d). Structure by age and sex of beneficiaries of temporary protection in the EU, end of December 2024 (%), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Temporary_protection_for_persons_fleeing_Ukraine_-_monthly_statistics, pp. 1–2; access date 13.12.2024

Eurostat (2024e). Temporary protection for persons fleeing Ukraine – in the states as at 31.12.2024, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Temporary_protection; access date 13.12.2024

Eurostat (2024f). Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, Age and sex. Annual Aggregated Data (Rounded). Asylum Applicant, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asyappctza/default/table; access date 13.12.2024

Non-paper. (n. d.). New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Joint Position of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia, 18.12.2020, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2020-09/new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-package_1.pdf; access date 15.12.2024

Procedure 2015/0125/NLE (2015a), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2015_125/; access date 15.12.2024

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

Procedure 2015/0208/COD (2015b), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2015_208/; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2015/0209/NLE (2015c), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2015_209/; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2015/0211/COD (2015d), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2015_211>, pp. 1–2; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2015/0310/COD (2015e), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2015_310/; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2016/0131/COD (2016a), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2016_131; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2016/0132/COD (2016b), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2016_132; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2016/0133/COD (2016c), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2016_133/, pp. 1–2; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2016/0222/COD (2016d), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2016_222; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2016/0223/COD (2016e), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2016_223; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2016/0224 (COD) (2016f), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2016_224; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2016/0225/COD (2016g), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2016_225; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2018/0329/COD (2018), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2018_329; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2020/0277 (COD) (2020a), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2020_277; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2020/0278 (COD) (2020b), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2020_278; access date 15.12.2024
Procedure 2020/0279 (COD) (2020c), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2020_279; access date 15.12.2024
Protocol (No. 22) on the position of Denmark (n. d.). OJ C, No. 326.
Protocol (No. 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, OJ C, No. 326.
Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23.12.2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU), OJ L, 2020, No. 437.
Regulation (EU) 2021/836 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20.05.2021 amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L, 2021, No. 185.
Regulation (EU) 2022/2463 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14.12.2022 establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +), OJ L, 2022, No. 322.
Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29.02.2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility, OJ L, 2024, No. 792.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/

U. S. Committee for refugees and immigrants. (n. d.). The Humanitarian and Displacement Situation in Ukraine. https://refugees.org/ukraine-october-2024/; access date 15.12.2024
UNHCR (2017a). The UN Refugee Agency. Bureau for Europe, Feb. 2017, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/56311, pp. 1–9; access date 20.12.2024
UNHCR (2017b). The UN Refugee Agency. Mediterranean. Dead and Missing at sea, April 2017, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/56311; access date 20.12.2024
UNHCR (2023). The implementation of the temporary protection directive, October 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/96266; access date 31.12.2024
UNHCR (2024a). Ukraine Humanitarian Crisis, https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disasters/ukraine-humanitarian-crisis/; access date 12.01.2025
UNHCR (2024b). Ukraine Refugee Situation, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location?secret=unhcrrestricted; access date 15.02.2025
UNHCR (2024c). Ukraine Refugee Situation. Select location, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location?secret=unhcrrestricted; access date 15.02.2025

Monographs, articles

Buzan B., Wæver O., de Wilde J, Security (1998). A New Framework for Analysis, London: Boulder.
Diskaya, A. (2020). Towards a Critical Securitization Theory, The Copenhagen and Aberystwyth Schools of Security Studies.
European Migration Network (2024). Application of the Temporary Protection Directive. challenges and good practices in 2023 EMN Study. Brussels.
Humanitarian Aid and Empowerment of Ukrainian Refugees. The Case of Visegrad Group countries: Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (2024). D. Moroń, M. Madej, J. Csoba (Eds.), London: Routledge.
Huysmans J. (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, 751–77.
Waever O. (1998). Securitization and Desecuritization. In: On Security, R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), New York: Columbia University Press.
Węc J. J. (2017). Reforma polityki imigracyjnej, kontroli granic zewnętrznych oraz polityki azylowej Unii Europejskiej w dobie kryzysu migracyjnego (2015–2016). *Przegląd Zachodni*, 2(363), 7–39.
Węc J. J. (2023a). Fiasko reformy polityki imigracyjnej, kontroli granic zewnętrznych oraz polityki azylowej UE w latach 2015–2020. Analiza krytyczna, *Politeja*, 6(87), 25–44. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.20.2023.87.02
Węc J. J. (2023b). Zu den Perspektiven der Reform der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union bis 2025. Strategische Autonomie der EU?, In: B. Gierat-Bieroń, J. J. Węc (Eds.), Europa und die Europäer. Perspektiven der polnischen Wissenschaft im 21. Jahrhundert. Im Gedenken an Bronisław Geremek. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. https://doi.org/10.13173/9783447120241

About the Author: Janusz Józef Węc (Prof.) specialist in comparative history and international relations, Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian University in Krakow, janusz.wec@uj.edu.pl.

Only for use in personal emails to professional colleagues and for use in the author's own seminars and courses. No upload to platforms. For any other form of publication, please refer to our self archiving rules https://www.steiner-verlag.de/en/Service/For-authors/Self-archiving/